JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE NEWS ROUNDUP, FEBRUARY 14: ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA
Reprinted, with permission, from the JVP list serve. JVP can be contacted at: http://salsa.democracyinaction.org.
Hamas’ act of breaching the wall that separated Gaza from Egypt was an event whose importance must not be underestimated. Its significance is amply demonstrated by the reverberations that are still being felt and the shifts in the political discourse that are not only ongoing, but multiplying.
Leading Palestinian pollster, Khalil Shikaki has consistently reported, almost from the time Hamas was elected in January 2006, on the gradual decline the group’s popularity has faced. (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=w12H5jB9WljvgPVZwexVtx7z4axJQXwT) As he explains in this interview, the decline was slow and steady with the exception of last June, when Hamas took control of Gaza. That month saw a precipitous drop in Hamas’ popularity. Yet, even before the wall breach last month, Shikaki observed that the decline had stopped.
Shikaki attributes that change to Israel’s siege on the Strip, and the attacks within Gaza by the IDF which were escalating even then. While Shikaki does not have new polling data since the Rafah wall was breached, his reading of the pulse of the Palestinian populace is that Hamas’ popularity is back at least to the level it was at before the takeover. While he believes the breach of the wall was a significant factor in this rise, he attributes it primarily to Israel’s siege, attacks and power cuts.
Hamas may have decided to resume attacks on Israeli civilians, but they have still reaped substantial gains from breaching the wall. They have now put Israel, Egypt and Fatah on the defensive. They have established their control in Gaza and made it impossible to avoid dealing with them, although Israel and Fatah (as well as the United States) are clinging to that course. But with Hamas’ rejuvenated popularity, (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=Hclj9odXBvMCe7cjfBrSdR7z4axJQXwT) they are now in a position where a major Israeli attack could well be the death blow to the Palestinian Authority and further boost Hamas.
(http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=mjIrfEZJcB15%2FbQxCV%2FhH1Uvz8XlKWrz) Fatah is saying that it has undertaken “major democratic reforms,” which would address the major reason they lost the 2006 elections in the first place. But it remains to be seen if the Palestinian people deem these reforms sufficient and whether the failure to win any substantive concessions from Israel has not eroded their credibility beyond repair.
(http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=%2B89Ht06DTeta6O85f7Sx9R7z4axJQXwT) Israel is now contemplating the large-scale invasion of Gaza that had been off the table for a while. Meanwhile, it has begun instituting minor cuts in electricity to Gaza, smaller than those it had initially imposed before Hamas breached the wall. These power cuts have brought a great deal of criticism, as they are collective punishment, <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=IzKcKwS0z2CJI8m3aRPe4×7z4axJQXwT>and that criticism has even come from countries that are generally supportive of Israel. But, as this <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=1qaavXzfoJghwXjj6hGYfx7z4axJQXwT>UN OCHA report details, the current cuts are small and have limited impact.
What is important to realize is that it is not the current power cuts, but rather the longer term siege and Israeli attacks that are causing the massive power shortages in Gaza. In 2006, after Palestinian groups captured an Israeli soldier (who is still being held by Hamas), Israel launched a major offensive in Gaza which nearly destroyed the Strip’s only power plant. Although new transformers were installed, the plant’s maximum output is now less than 60% of its former capacity. This meant that Gaza, already dependent upon Israel for some 40% of its electricity needs was now getting some 60% of it from Israel.
Moreover, the plant itself is dependent upon Israeli shipments of fuel to keep it running. This was the issue that was at the fore at the beginning of the year. Since Gaza has already used up the reserve fuel for the plant (reserves that would have lasted by themselves for about 9 days), this gives Israel control over virtually all of Gaza’s power supply. While Israel talks about ways to completely sever its relationship with Gaza, this is precisely the sort of root that 41 years of occupation has put down that makes it impossible to simply decide to separate. It will take years for Gaza to either build up its own capacity or construct a new feeder system with Egypt to begin to replace the electricity it gets from Israel.
In all of this, the current electricity cuts are merely one more log on an already large fire, one that is threatening to burn Gaza to the ground.
These are not the only effects of the stubborn refusal of Israel to find a solution that involves neither collective punishment nor military action. And that seems unlikely to change, given the sort of narrow view that (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=kqCf2FsYXbUy2yv803nFQh7z4axJQXwT) Defense Minister Ehud Barak brings to the problem. The occupation also institutionalized a sort of “captive economy” in the West Bank and Gaza and the siege policy and the generally cold business atmosphere that has been created by the greatly heightened conflict in recent years has cut deeply into Israeli exports to the Palestinian Territories. So, in this sense, (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=WWs%2BzbYANsJo6CahsMdGwh7z4axJQXwT) Israel is hurting itself in order to inflict much greater harm on the Palestinians. It should also be added that the ongoing siege is having an impact that is not being seen beyond the travails of Sderot and the increasingly grim outlook among most Israelis. Israel’s economy is also taking some serious hits because of their foolhardy tactics.
And all the while, the rockets continue to hit Sderot and other Negev towns, meaning the Israeli government is also refusing to acknowledge that the policy of confrontation has failed to gain any security for its own citizens. As a (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=6PUT8eAMM7NRjpmXXyX6xx7z4axJQXwT) Hamas spokesman expresses in Ha’aretz the policy has only strengthened the group’s resolve toward a path of violence, particularly since Israel won’t even respond to Hamas’ floating of cease-fire possibilities. For its part, <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=K5RTA8QzC8fW3J7A0imhpR7z4axJQXwT>Hamas seems intent on escalating matters despite the effects on the population of Gaza.
If Israel does make good on its (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=TV%2FEPoiVfU65qpwgBf7eoh7z4axJQXwT) threat to invade Gaza again and possibly (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=mZ%2BsUeIvfG57GxAYAPiKSx7z4axJQXwT) target the Hamas political leadership they will be doing so in the hope that the Palestinian Authority can finally assume control of the Strip. Yet even if they succeed in toppling Hamas (something not at all certain by any means) they will also have (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=R4LO1nK6KRDOVeBBNvZWmR7z4axJQXwT) severely undermined the credibility of Mahmoud Abbas and enraged the Palestinian populace even further. One wonders how many times it will have to be proven to Israel that these tactics do not work before it finally takes the lesson to heart.
