CHINA NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND IT HAS A COMMON INTEREST WITH TIBETANS TO TREAT THEM WITH RESPECT

CHINA NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND IT HAS A COMMON INTEREST WITH TIBETANS TO TREAT THEM WITH RESPECT

Stephen M. Sachs, “China Needs to Understand It Has a Common Interest with Tibetans to Treat Them With Respect”

China – for its own and the world’s interest – needs to dialogue with the Tibetans (particularly the Dalai Lama). The Turks are finally investing in Kurdish development and cultural respect to undermine the destabilizing violence they cannot eliminate by force alone. The United States, as a whole, is benefiting from switching from repressing Indian tribes, to allowing them self-determination. The Indian nations are now improving their condition, and greatly benefiting the surrounding areas as their economies improve, and their governments become increasingly capable partners in American Federalism. China needs to be encouraged to understand that it is in its interest to do the same. The Dalai Lama has been open to cooperating with the Chinese government on building a collaborative and mutually respectful autonomy. This is in everyone’s interest, and China would be wise to grasp the opportunity to do so.

China is again a strong nation. It has long passed the time of being threatened with invasion by outside powers. The only real security threat to China is its over concern with security and, thus, control. China will be much stronger and prosperous at home, and more appreciated abroad, if it can see that the time has come to be internally more inclusive. Indeed, such a change would make it easier to complete reconciliation with Taiwan.

SHOOTING UNARMED DEMONSTRATORS ON THE GAZA BORDER

SHOOTING UNARMED DEMONSTRATORS ON THE GAZA BORDER

WOULD BE A TERRIBLE AND UNFORGIVABLE CRIME

Gush Shalom, Press Release, February 25, 2008

The Government of Israel has turned the Gaza Strip into a pressure cooker and the biggest open-air prison in the world, through maintaining a siege in violation of International Law and depriving a poor populating of a million and half of gasoline and basic products. Those who created this pressure cooker cannot wonder that it now threatens to explode in their face. If the threat to open fire and kill unarmed Palestinian demonstrators on the Gaza Strip border is implemented, no one would be able to claim innocence of this heinous crime: neither the ministers and army commanders on top, nor those who pull the trigger on the ground said Gush Shalom in messages sent tonight to the bureau of PM Olmert, Defense Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Livni.

When Qassam missiles are shot, the Government of Israel is quick to accuse the Palestinians of violent terrorism. But now, also the possibility of mass non-violent protest is presented as a threat justifying the brute force. There have been many cases when the army faced rampaging settlers, who resorted to the worst of violent behaviour – and not a single drop of blood was ever shed. The light finger on the trigger is reserved only for Arab demonstrators – but tomorrow, the whole world will be minutely watching the behaviour of the State of Israel and its armed forces. Your acts tomorrow might cause many to feel ashamed of being Israeli, and lose Israel a large part of the few international friends it still has.

CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Alon Ben-Meir, March 20, 2008

The killing by Israeli undercover troops of four Palestinian militants in Bethlehem, on March 12, raises questions not as much about Israel’s right to self-defense but about the context and the circumstances under which this right is exercised. Even the right to self-defense and matters of national security must be balanced against the prevailing conditions. In this instance, Israel has made an egregious mistake by killing four individuals whose continued threat to Israel pales compared to the Palestinian rage the act has provoked and with it the potential for retaliatory violent acts against Israel.

However justified the killing may have been from the Israeli perspective, neither the targeted men nor the circumstances, or for that matter, the timing lend credence to Israel’s claim of self-defense, not to speak of its commitment to a negotiated settlement. Here is why: First, the four individuals appeared to have renounced violence, they posed no imminent danger, and hoped to be included in an amnesty agreement with Israel but were refused. Second, their killing shattered the calm of Bethlehem, a city which has been the calmest of all the Palestinian cities and which was planning to host an international investor’s conference in May. Third, the Israeli raid occurred at a delicate time embarrassing the Egyptians who were hard at work trying to arrange for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Fourth, Israel is in the midst of peace negotiations with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who now feels severely undermined by the Israeli action. Fifth, the raid came on the heels of two-weeks of intensified violence in Gaza and Jerusalem, which killed 126 Palestinians and at least 12 Israelis and shook both communities amid international calls for calm. Finally, the raid seems to defy the logic behind Israel’s peacemaking strategy, as this particular act of killing will certainly play itself out in the Palestinian streets.

It will be a mistake to ignore Israel’s legitimate concerns over the countless acts of violence perpetrated against its citizens by radical Palestinians from different political and religious affiliations. The string of suicide bombings during the second Intifadah left an indelible mark on every Israeli, and the endless barrage from Kassam rockets as well as the recent killing of eight young Yeshiva students has only reinforced Israel’s zealous concerns over the security of its citizens. Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s sworn commitment to destroy Israel has created a fatalistic mindset among the Israelis that has made their survival a zero-sum game against the survival of members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Moreover, the Israeli government argues that while it is committed to the peace process, it cannot afford to sit by idly, allowing known killers of Israelis to freely roam or not intervene to foil an imminent terrorist attack when the PA has failed to act. Thus, from the Israeli perspective, the four had to be killed not only because they have Jewish blood on their hands but because, given the opportunity, they would have killed Israelis again and again because they do not accept Israel’s right to exist.

But while understanding Israeli logic and sympathizing with it, there remains one fundamental question: When will Israel’s leaders conclude that, despite the constant belligerency, there is a time when the elimination of certain individuals causes more harm than good and that targeted killing is not the answer to Palestinian resistance? However Israel explains its recent targeted killing, the government cannot avoid the perception if not the reality that this act is 1) totally inconsistent with the peace process, 2) plays into the hands of extremist Palestinians who argue against the peace negotiations, 3) perpetuates the vicious cycle of violent acts of revenge and retribution, 4) weakens the authority of Mahmoud Abbas, Israel’s main negotiating partner, 5) raises serious questions about Israel’s ultimate intentions, especially as it continues to expand existing settlements, and 6) angers many Arab states that view the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as central to their stability.

Whereas the targeted killing has been, from the Israeli vantage point, extremely effective, the Israeli defense apparatus must consider the political context under which these attacks are occurring. If peace with the Palestinians is Israel’s strategic choice, then it behooves its leaders to demonstrate not only the ability to reach every terrorist but the political skills to manage the ongoing violence without damaging the peace negotiations. The principle of killing every Palestinian fugitive with blood on his hands, regardless of the circumstances, is blindly misguided because it begs the question as to when and under what conditions should the killings end. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians requires more than cessation of hostilities; it demands a demonstration of good faith, the rebuilding of trust, and genuine efforts to reconcile. The wounds inflicted by both sides are deep, painful, and have left many ugly scars. A measure of forgiveness and forgetting on both sides, whenever the opportunity presents itself, is critical if Israelis and Palestinians wish to ever coexist in peace.

Israel will not be able to redeem every Palestinian militant, but it must give a chance to those who have forsaken violence, even if they have not embraced peaceful coexistence. Israel’s demonstrable desire for peace must not be put to question by mindless and unnecessary killings.

Professor Alon Ben-Meir is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiations and Middle Eastern studies, and can be reached at: alon@alonben-meir.com www.alonben-meir.com

DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA

JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE NEWS ROUNDUP, FEBRUARY 14: ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA

Reprinted, with permission, from the JVP list serve. JVP can be contacted at: http://salsa.democracyinaction.org.

Hamas’ act of breaching the wall that separated Gaza from Egypt was an event whose importance must not be underestimated. Its significance is amply demonstrated by the reverberations that are still being felt and the shifts in the political discourse that are not only ongoing, but multiplying.

Leading Palestinian pollster, Khalil Shikaki has consistently reported, almost from the time Hamas was elected in January 2006, on the gradual decline the group’s popularity has faced. (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=w12H5jB9WljvgPVZwexVtx7z4axJQXwT) As he explains in this interview, the decline was slow and steady with the exception of last June, when Hamas took control of Gaza. That month saw a precipitous drop in Hamas’ popularity. Yet, even before the wall breach last month, Shikaki observed that the decline had stopped.

Shikaki attributes that change to Israel’s siege on the Strip, and the attacks within Gaza by the IDF which were escalating even then. While Shikaki does not have new polling data since the Rafah wall was breached, his reading of the pulse of the Palestinian populace is that Hamas’ popularity is back at least to the level it was at before the takeover. While he believes the breach of the wall was a significant factor in this rise, he attributes it primarily to Israel’s siege, attacks and power cuts.

Hamas may have decided to resume attacks on Israeli civilians, but they have still reaped substantial gains from breaching the wall. They have now put Israel, Egypt and Fatah on the defensive. They have established their control in Gaza and made it impossible to avoid dealing with them, although Israel and Fatah (as well as the United States) are clinging to that course. But with Hamas’ rejuvenated popularity, (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=Hclj9odXBvMCe7cjfBrSdR7z4axJQXwT) they are now in a position where a major Israeli attack could well be the death blow to the Palestinian Authority and further boost Hamas.

(http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=mjIrfEZJcB15%2FbQxCV%2FhH1Uvz8XlKWrz) Fatah is saying that it has undertaken “major democratic reforms,”  which would address the major reason they lost the 2006 elections in the first place. But it remains to be seen if the Palestinian people deem these reforms sufficient and whether the failure to win any substantive concessions from Israel has not eroded their credibility beyond repair.

(http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=%2B89Ht06DTeta6O85f7Sx9R7z4axJQXwT) Israel is now contemplating the large-scale invasion of Gaza that had been off the table for a while. Meanwhile, it has begun instituting minor cuts in electricity to Gaza, smaller than those it had initially imposed before Hamas breached the wall. These power cuts have brought a great deal of criticism, as they are collective punishment, <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=IzKcKwS0z2CJI8m3aRPe4×7z4axJQXwT>and that criticism has even come from countries that are generally supportive of Israel. But, as this <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=1qaavXzfoJghwXjj6hGYfx7z4axJQXwT>UN OCHA report details, the current cuts are small and have limited impact.

What is important to realize is that it is not the current power cuts, but rather the longer term siege and Israeli attacks that are causing the massive power shortages in Gaza. In 2006, after Palestinian groups captured an Israeli soldier (who is still being held by Hamas), Israel launched a major offensive in Gaza which nearly destroyed the Strip’s only power plant. Although new transformers were installed, the plant’s maximum output is now less than 60% of its former capacity. This meant that Gaza, already dependent upon Israel for some 40% of its electricity needs was now getting some 60% of it from Israel.

Moreover, the plant itself is dependent upon Israeli shipments of fuel to keep it running. This was the issue that was at the fore at the beginning of the year. Since Gaza has already used up the reserve fuel for the plant (reserves that would have lasted by themselves for about 9 days), this gives Israel control over virtually all of Gaza’s power supply. While Israel talks about ways to completely sever its relationship with Gaza, this is precisely the sort of root that 41 years of occupation has put down that makes it impossible to simply decide to separate. It will take years for Gaza to either build up its own capacity or construct a new feeder system with Egypt to begin to replace the electricity it gets from Israel.

In all of this, the current electricity cuts are merely one more log on an already large fire, one that is threatening to burn Gaza to the ground.

These are not the only effects of the stubborn refusal of Israel to find a solution that involves neither collective punishment nor military action. And that seems unlikely to change, given the sort of narrow view that (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=kqCf2FsYXbUy2yv803nFQh7z4axJQXwT) Defense Minister Ehud Barak brings to the problem. The occupation also institutionalized a sort of “captive economy” in the West Bank and Gaza and the siege policy and the generally cold business atmosphere that has been created by the greatly heightened conflict in recent years has cut deeply into Israeli exports to the Palestinian Territories. So, in this sense, (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=WWs%2BzbYANsJo6CahsMdGwh7z4axJQXwT) Israel is hurting itself in order to inflict much greater harm on the Palestinians. It should also be added that the ongoing siege is having an impact that is not being seen beyond the travails of Sderot and the increasingly grim outlook among most Israelis. Israel’s economy is also taking some serious hits because of their foolhardy tactics.

And all the while, the rockets continue to hit Sderot and other Negev towns, meaning the Israeli government is also refusing to acknowledge that the policy of confrontation has failed to gain any security for its own citizens. As a (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=6PUT8eAMM7NRjpmXXyX6xx7z4axJQXwT) Hamas spokesman expresses in Ha’aretz the policy has only strengthened the group’s resolve toward a path of violence, particularly since Israel won’t even respond to Hamas’ floating of cease-fire possibilities. For its part, <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=K5RTA8QzC8fW3J7A0imhpR7z4axJQXwT>Hamas seems intent on escalating matters despite the effects on the population of Gaza.

If Israel does make good on its (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=TV%2FEPoiVfU65qpwgBf7eoh7z4axJQXwT) threat to invade Gaza again and possibly (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=mZ%2BsUeIvfG57GxAYAPiKSx7z4axJQXwT) target the Hamas political leadership they will be doing so in the hope that the Palestinian Authority can finally assume control of the Strip. Yet even if they succeed in toppling Hamas (something not at all certain by any means) they will also have (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=R4LO1nK6KRDOVeBBNvZWmR7z4axJQXwT) severely undermined the credibility of Mahmoud Abbas and enraged the Palestinian populace even further. One wonders how many times it will have to be proven to Israel that these tactics do not work before it finally takes the lesson to heart.

DIMINISHING HAMAS

DIMINISHING HAMAS

Alon Ben-Meir, February 18, 2008

The most acute problem facing Israeli officials today is how to end the daily Kassam rocket attacks intended to demoralize Israelis and to undermine the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel insists–rightfully–that Hamas, as the self-proclaimed authority in Gaza, is to blame and must suffer the consequences. The question is what to do so that Hamas is weakened rather than strengthened by the Israeli punitive counter measures while progress continues in the peace negotiations.

The current Israeli strategy of targeted killings–preemption to foil an imminent attack, coupled with an economic squeeze–has produced limited if not counterproductive results. Although Hamas’ leaders and fighters are on the run and the Palestinian people are in dire straits, Hamas and its surrogates still manage to resist the Israelis and galvanize the masses against Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Israelis, meanwhile, are unhappy with their army’s inability to stop the rocket attacks, and those suffering the brunt of them in Sderot are demanding an immediate solution that ends the constant threat and the accompanying psychological anguish. Although Israel is working on an air defense system to intercept short-range rockets, it is perhaps more than a year away from deployment. The current situation remains untenable because it portrays Israel as weak and indecisive before an inferior foe, which has led to the call for invading Gaza.

Considering the despicable socio-economic conditions of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, invading it, as many Israelis and some officials advocate, will not provide a long-term solution. The majority of Palestinians in Gaza have very little left to lose, and they blame Israel for their miserable existence. Given such circumstances, other than causing heavy Israeli and Palestinian casualties, an invasion will simply cause Palestinians and Arabs to rally round an embattled Hamas, making the re-occupation of Gaza by Israel, however short it is, a bloody and most costly venture for the Israelis. An invasion will play directly into Hamas’ hands in other ways, too. It will derail negotiations with the PA, provoke international condemnation, create a humanitarian crisis, and leave Israel with having to find a dignified exit without any assurances that the rocket attacks will stop even before the last Israeli soldier leaves. Moreover, Hamas’ fighters–alive or dead–will be seen as heroes and martyrs for having fought the mighty Israeli army. Thus the invasion, regardless of its level of success, will attract new recruits for Hamas while deepening the resolve of its followers, fueling their religious zeal to continue violent resistance at whatever cost. To be sure, an invasion will weaken Hamas militarily for a time, but it cannot eradicate it as a mass movement.

This leaves Israel with one valid option, which will take longer to implement but lead to the diminution of Hamas in the eyes of its followers and change the Palestinian political dynamic in favor of the PA in Gaza and the West Bank. The basic premise is for Israel to increasingly alienate the Palestinians living under Hamas’ rule from the organization’s leaders, whose policies of violent resistance have already brought more suffering than relief. This will happen not when Israel kills every Hamas member it finds but when Hamas’ ideology is discredited and its strategy of violent resistance has failed, and finally, when its leadership realizes that only moderation will give the organization a legitimate political role.

With the split between Hamas and Fatah, Israel is in a much better position to alienate Hamas’ followers by working closely with the PA and by making it clear that any relief Palestinians in Gaza receive comes from, or is precipitated by, the Abbas government. One of the most important steps that Israel should take is to allow the PA, along with EU monitors on the Palestinian side, to control the six crossings (one to Egypt and five to Israel). I was told by a top Palestinian official that the PA has 600 men from the Palestinian Guard ready to assume control. Opening the borders would give the population of Gaza a clear sign that the PA, under the leadership of Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, cares about their well-being, and so, for the consequent improvement in their daily lives, the PA and not Hamas will be credited. If Hamas does not allow the PA to control the crossings, the people will blame Hamas for the siege and their continued suffering.

Israel should further strengthen the PA by implementing the first steps of the Road Map: 1) Freezing expansion of existing settlements, especially those not slated to be incorporated to Israel proper by an agreement with the Palestinians, 2) dismantling illegal outposts to demonstrate Israel is committed to ending the occupation, 3) removing checkpoints not essential to Israel’s security to ease the life of many Palestinians, facilitate reconstruction, and end unnecessary humiliation, 4) releasing more prisoners, an extremely sensitive issue for all Palestinians and 5) reopening national institutions in Jerusalem. These practical measures will strengthen the moderates under Mr. Abbas while weakening Hamas for failing to deliver the same goods. Surely, some of the measures will pose security risks for Israel, but then, these must be weighed against the advantages they could generate over time. That said, the PA must also demonstrate that it is leaving no stone unturned to end the violence against Israel, especially from the Al-Aksa Brigade, which is affiliated with the PA. In addition, to convince the Israeli public of its absolute commitment to peaceful coexistence, the PA must also stop all public incitements by the media, in schools, and the mosques.

Obviously no perfect recipe exists, not if we consider the nature of Hamas as a grass-roots movement and the political and social environment in which it exists. But Israel should not fall into Hamas’ trap and allow the Israeli public’s inflamed emotions to overrun a well reasoned and carefully executed course of action.

Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. alon@alonben-meir.com, www.alonben-meir.com.

THE RECENT GAZA ESCALATION

THE RECENT GAZA ESCALATION

Americans for Peace Now, March 3, 2008, http://www.peacenow.org

This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to publish.

Over the past few days Israelis, Palestinians, and the world have witnessed the unfolding of a serious and dangerous military escalation between Israel and Hamas. This crisis is a symptom of failed policies, irresponsible actions, and a lack of strategic thinking. Further escalating the violence in Gaza may deal a fatal blow to the credibility and viability of the peace process, and would erode support for the peace process among both Israelis and Palestinians. Many would argue that this is precisely what Hamas wants; we would argue that this is yet another important reason to avoid such an escalation.

Hamas knows that while its rockets can sow fear and suffering in Sderot and now Ashkelon, they cannot destroy Israel and will not break the economic blockade. Israel’s military leaders know that while the IDF can achieve short-term tactical gains in Gaza, it cannot destroy popular support for Hamas or stop future rockets from falling.

Americans for Peace Now (APN) and its Israeli sister organisation, Peace Now, have repeatedly expressed solidarity with the residents of Israeli communities near Gaza, residents who have suffered a campaign of Qassam rockets attacks since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005. The government of Israel has the right ˆ indeed, the obligation ˆ to bring these attacks to a halt, and to try to free its captured soldier, Gilad Shalit. APN has also consistently held that Israel should avoid actions that constitute collective punishment or cause disproportionate suffering or casualties among civilians. Such actions are fundamentally wrong and ultimately counterproductive.

Lessons of the 2006 Lebanon War should not be lost here. Any realistic, sustainable resolution to this crisis will require Israel and Hamas to engage, directly or indirectly, to achieve a ceasefire or hudna. The only questions then are: how many more Israelis and Palestinians will die or be wounded in the interim; how much less international sympathy Israel will have when the ceasefire is being negotiated; how much bigger will the disaster on the ground be, both in Israel and Gaza, once a ceasefire is achieved; and how much damage will have been done to the credibility and viability of the peace process and the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps?

Such an approach has been embraced to various degrees by key Israeli security figures, including former national security advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Giora Eiland, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, and former defence minister Shaul Mofaz. In the context of the current crisis, this approach has been strongly advocated by former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon, a Minister-without-portfolio in the Olmert government.

It is especially imperative for the Bush Administration, as the main shepherd of the Annapolis peace process, to support ˆ or at least not block ˆ efforts to reach a ceasefire, stabilise Gaza, and re-build Palestinian national unity. It is time to at last recognise the failure of the dogmatic policy of boycotting Hamas and blockading Gaza, and replace it with a pragmatic policy incorporating support for strategic, self-interested engagement between Israel and Hamas, either through direct contacts or via third parties, including President Abbas.

The United States, and all those who support Israel and Israeli-Palestinian peace, must recognise that the current situation in Gaza, including the recent escalation, is a threat to the newly-launched peace process. In the present context, both Israeli leaders and Palestinian Authority President Abbas have little credibility with their publics as they pursue peace talks, and the peace talks themselves are widely viewed with scepticism or disdain.

As we have said often in the past, a hudna, or ceasefire cannot be an end in itself. A ceasefire or hudna is desirable as a means to halt violence and chaos in the immediate term, creating the space to facilitate improvements in the humanitarian situation, stabilise the political situation, and get the process back on track to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this way, it can allow the sides to avoid the re-emergence of violence in the longer term. Absent improvements in the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the re-emergence of a serious, productive political process, any ceasefire or hudna risks becoming merely an intermission to allow those attacking Israel to re-arm, re-trench, and enhance their military capability.

PREPARE TO SIGN

PREPARE TO SIGN

Ha’aretz Editorial, “Prepare to Sign”

Source: Ha’aretz (http://www.haaretz.com), March 11, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

Israel is conducting two dialogues in parallel. One with its back to the enemy and the other with a potential partner. With Hamas, Israel’s stance is to pretend “as if.” As if there are no negotiations, as if there are no understandings, as if Israel did not succeed in twisting the group’s arm. With the Palestinian Authority, Israel is making the right noises on cooperating to reach a signed agreement, even if it is labeled a “shelf agreement.” In other words, not a realistic agreement for now.

The two dialogues are leading to an impasse. Without a real accord on a bilateral cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, the relative calm characterized by the relatively small number of rockets fired against Israel will not last. Such an understanding cannot rely on hints; it needs the backing and cooperation of Egypt, which is meant to supervise its side at the border crossings. The understanding also requires the cooperation of the Palestinian Authority, which is party to the crossings agreement signed in 2005.

For now, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is rejecting any dialogue with Hamas before the Islamic group restores the Gaza Strip to the situation before June 2007, when it took over the territory. Without an internal Palestinian agreement, and as long as the crossings remain shut, the situation in Gaza will remain explosive and Hamas will continue monopolizing control over the next flare-up.

At the same time, the PA, which exhibited amazing powerlessness in view of the events in Gaza and the subsequent terrorist attacks, cannot offer the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip an appropriate alternative to their miserable existence. The talks with Israel are still not providing a political horizon, or at least a positive scenario that could encourage the Palestinians. This is also the reason for the PA’s weakness in dealing with terrorism, as demanded by Israel.

This situation, which also worries Israeli intelligence officials, may spark the outbreak of yet another intifada. Even worse, as long as the feeling persists that the talks with Israel are pointless, Hamas can continue to argue that only it can change Israel’s position.

In light of this difficult situation, it is hard to understand why Israel continues to drag its feet and does not reach a real agreement with the PA. It is not a zero-sum game that Israel needs to play, but an overall outlook that the government must first adopt toward its citizens. This outlook should define the permanent borders Israel seeks, Jerusalem’s status, and the settlements’ future. As long as Israel does not answer these fundamental issues, it is hard to see how it can conduct effective negotiations with the Palestinians.

Israel may argue that the force of its response in the Gaza Strip may deter and restore calm. Experience proves that this is a baseless claim. Israel must therefore utilize the current lull and the PA’s willingness to immediately push forward in the negotiations and establish the parameters for a solution to the core issues, to get an agreement signed quickly.

MOVING FORWARD

MOVING FORWARD

Nehemia Shtrasler

Source: Ha’aretz (http://www.haaretz.com), March 4, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to publish.

In the winter of 1991, Saddam Hussein bombed Tel Aviv. For a month and a half, long-range missiles landed on the city. People panicked and many fled to Jerusalem, while the leaders issued pompous statements about the terrible blow the Iraqi dictator was about to receive. But nothing happened. We did nothing.

In February and March, 1996, buses exploded in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and dozens of people were killed in suicide bombings in the streets and restaurants. People who went to the grocery store did not know if they would return. Those who went to a restaurant or disco were seen as risking their lives. Shimon Peres, who was then prime minister, realised that the suicide attacks would destroy him politically but could do nothing to prevent them. Sure enough, Benjamin Netanyahu won the elections.

In 2001-2003, terror struck in the heart of Israel again. The suicide bombings emptied the shopping centres, tourism halted, businesspeople went bankrupt and received no compensation. The economy plunged into a deep recession amid rising unemployment. Even then we did not enter an all-out war in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

So it is wrong to argue that the state has abandoned Sderot and the western Negev. If this is abandonment, then Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were abandoned as well. The truth is more prosaic: Power has limitations. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) cannot solve everything. Netanyahu may say there is a simple solution ˆ “to move from attrition to the offensive” ˆ but the reality is more complicated. The IDF acted on the outskirts of Gaza’s densely populated territory and two soldiers were killed. Had the army pushed deeper, the number of fatalities would have risen sharply.

International pressure would have risen as well. The United Nations has already condemned us, Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian arbitrator, cancelled his visit to Israel, and scenes from the beginning of the second Intifada in October 2000 returned to the West Bank. The Qassam and Grad rockets continued falling even when the IDF was inside Gaza, and yesterday Hamas hastened to declare victory.

Another irritating lie in the Israeli discourse insists that it is appropriate to make Gazans’ lives a living hell, so that they will put pressure on their leaders to end the firing of rockets. This thesis was behind the first Lebanon war, but that fallacy didn’t work either, even when hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were forced to flee to the north.

That was also the thesis behind the Second Lebanon War. But despite the Lebanese population’s extreme suffering, it didn’t work then either. It is certainly not working in Gaza. There things are horrifically bad. Poverty is awful, the number of fatalities is huge, the hospitals are collapsing from too many wounded, unemployment has reached the extraordinary level of 60 percent, and most of the population subsists on food provided by United Nations organisations.

People in such a difficult situation have nothing left but their self-respect. In these days “all of Gaza has become Hamas,” a former Fatah security officer who is far from being a Hamas supporter, told Ha‚aretz. Al Jazeera is broadcasting to every home the horror pictures of the deaths of dozens of children and women.

In this situation, hatred triumphs and the only hope is the desire to take revenge. The rocket launchers are thus the heroes who gain the people’s sympathy, and support for Hamas is not getting any smaller – it’s growing. Once we didn’t want to talk to the PLO and Arafat. Then we humiliated Abbas and didn’t want to give him any achievement during the disengagement. Now we don’t want to talk to Hamas. So the struggle will continue˜until a catastrophe occurs, on their side or ours. Only then will the leaders be forced to sit down and talk around the negotiating table.

So there is no escape but to talk to Hamas. We cannot choose our enemies. We embraced Yasser Arafat after saying for dozens of years (in the words of Yitzhak Rabin) that “we’ll meet the PLO only on the battlefield.” Indeed, signing an agreement with Hamas is risky. An agreement could weaken Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whom Israel sees as a fitting partner. But it also harbours hope. We could make a cease-fire arrangement consisting of stopping the rocket fire in exchange for stopping the assassinations. We could agree on a prisoner exchange and bring Gilad Shalit home.

We could even alleviate the economic siege in an agreement that would prevent transferring weapons and explosives via the Rafah crossing. All this is attainable, and is many times preferable to continuing the bloodbath, which would only raise the walls of hatred and revenge higher.

*Nehemia Shtrasler is economic affairs, publicist for Ha’aretz.

JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE CONDEMS ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE

JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE CONDEMS ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN MIDDLE EAST

CALLS FOR U.S. TO SUPPORT JOINT CEASEFIRE, END ITS SUPPORT OF OCCUPATION, March 6, 2008

[Oakland, March 6, 2008] Earlier this week, American peace group Jewish Voice for Peace (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=plBGGdTn4FCEYjgN1VHaNd0kdNi7rhWP) expressed outrage at the terrible loss of life in the latest escalation of violence in the Middle East in Gaza and Sderot. We also called for an immediate joint ceasefire, and an end to Israel’s blockade of Gaza, which has barred food, medical supplies and fuel from an already desperately poor and malnourished 1.5 million Palestinians.

Today, we mourn the loss of 8 students at the Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. Jewish Voice for Peace believes the loss of just one person is one life too many. There is no difference in the immeasurable heartache felt by the parents of dozens of children killed in Gaza last week, or the parents of the 8 students killed yesterday in Jerusalem. All killings must stop.

As long as there is occupation and the brutality and violence it entails, we will mourn Israeli and Palestinian lives. In this context, media coverage that portrays violence as part of a short-term cycle of attack and retaliation obscures the facts, including the role the US has played, through covert action, in fomenting civil war in Gaza, as recently revealed by a (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=ICbAwGzJGBVov1LSIhYPg88BtnEoIZoM) groundbreaking report in Vanity Fair. As long as the United States continues to support Israel’s decades-long practice of illegally appropriating land, destroying homes, and using disproportionate force–a policy which has proven to be both morally bankrupt and self-destructive for Israel–neither Palestinians nor Israelis will ever know peace.

This latest tragedy also highlights the way in which the Israeli government has either allowed or encouraged its own citizens to be woven into the fabric of occupation. The Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva is the birthplace of Gush Emunim, one of Israel’s rightwing settler movements. Human rights groups have documented how the group systematically assaults Palestinians, destroys their crops, and attacks children on their way to school.

Today, Our House of Representatives passed an irresponsible and one-sided (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=TYhat3GS%2FutKwjBSZTinYs8BtnEoIZoM) resolution H.Res 951 that will only perpetuate the cycle of violence by ignoring the basic human rights of Palestinians. We call on the U.S. government to stop supporting Israel’s illegal occupation and to pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas, to facilitate an immediate mutual ceasefire and end to the siege on Gaza. A just and lasting peace is possible. A new poll conducted by Tel Aviv University shows that 64% of Israelis favor talks with Hamas. Talking to Hamas is the first step towards peace for both peoples.

Jewish Voice for Peace was founded in 1996, as a national grassroots peace organization dedicated to promoting a US foreign policy in the Middle East based on peace, democracy, human rights and respect for international law. JVP can be reached at: http://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org.

PERSEVERING IN THE FACE OF EXTREMEISM

PERSEVERING IN THE FACE OF EXTREMEISM

Mara Rudman*

Source: Middle East Progress (http://www.middleeastprogress.org), March 7, 2008. Distributed by Common Ground News service with permission for republication.

Too depressingly familiar. Eight young people killed, along with the gunman who ended their lives. Many more injured.

As is the intent of such extremists, he took aim not only at innocent civilians, but also at the heart of future security and hope for Israelis and Palestinians: a negotiated two-state resolution to their conflict. Ensuring that he not achieve this broader objective will require a renewed commitment by all involved, including the United States.

This latest gunman shares the goals of the Hamas Al-Qassem Brigades and Islamic Jihad militias firing rockets at Sderot and Ashkelon, the suicide bombers at the Dolphinarium, Baruch Goldstein in Hebron, and Yigal Amir, assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Yet, it was Rabin who said: “We shall fight terrorism as if there is no peace process, and pursue the peace process as if there is no terrorism.”

The two ends must be pursued simultaneously, and with equal intensity, and often even in the same space. This applies to the United States as much as to the Israelis, the Palestinians and all the other actors in the region. Carrying out such a dual-track approach requires courage, smarts, wisdom and willingness to withstand a good deal of political pressure˜and more; all of which the late Prime Minister Rabin embodied.

For Israelis and Palestinians, this means that President Abbas agreed to continue negotiations, not allowing the Hamas rockets and resulting Israeli response to permanently sidetrack talks, despite popular protests. It is the reason that Israel’s Foreign Ministry immediately issued a statement in the wake of the latest attack that peace talks would continue, as it condemned the attack. President Abbas also denounced the attack. (As might be expected, the Hamas leadership celebrated it.)

The United States should draw lessons from such action by Palestinian and Israeli leadership. We rightly need to be alongside the political leadership, as we were here, urging them to move forward with negotiations, while condemning the death and injury of innocents. Such efforts require a sustained presence and cannot rely simply on Secretary Rice’s occasional or coincidental presence in the region.

The United States can apply the lesson elsewhere as well. When we are dealing with a Syria or an Iran, we also must be capable of thinking in at least dual-track terms: each is a country with which we must address a long list of significant differences. And yet we also share some common interests and concerns. Certainly we should have sufficiently adept diplomats to find a basis for discussion even with such tough adversaries˜we cannot wait for every state to transform before we start to interact. In fact, our interaction can become a catalyst for changing behaviours.

In the case of Saudi Arabia or Egypt, we need to work in real partnership to pursue successfully regional peace and stability, and yet, just as we should be doing with Israelis and Palestinians, as with any real friends, we must be able to speak directly and frankly about where reform and growth is needed to ensure future regional stability and ongoing partnership. In turn, we must recognize that such honest dialogue works in both directions. That means, on occasion, we will be on the receiving end.

Whether with friends or adversaries, geopolitics is not so different from human relations: when we go into reactionary punishment mode initially it may feel satisfying but ultimately such reaction allows the extremist who provoked the behaviour to win. By halting our participation, taking us out of the conversation, stopping the negotiation, they have achieved precisely the end they sought. And they fill the open space left by our absence.

As countries, and as individuals, we will be tested regularly by those who seek to destroy our will and commitment to achieving a better, more secure future. Those with clear vision see that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a critical component for such an outcome in a more secure and stable Middle East. We must maintain the persistence to stay in the game when things go bad˜as they did last week in Jerusalem˜and keep our eyes on that better horizon, and the route to getting there, not allowing the bad guys to move the goal posts yet again.

*Mara Rudman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where she focuses on national security issues and advises Middle East Progress. She is also President of Quorum Strategies, an international strategic consulting firm.

A WAY OUT OF A DEADLY IMPASE

A WAY OUT OF A DEADLY IMPASE

Jerome M. Segal*

Source: Ha’aretz (http://www.haaretz.com), March 8, 2008. Distributed by Common Ground News Service with permission is for republication.

˜When Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas announced last week that he was suspending peace negotiations, most Israelis responded with indifference. With guns firing in Gaza and rockets landing in Sderot and Ashkelon, of what relevance are the talks with the PLO? I would argue that the peace negotiations, if reconceived, could provide the solution to the Gaza situation. Consider this: Suppose Israel does, in the next few months, reach a comprehensive final- status agreement with the PLO, with the understanding that its implementation will be performance-based and will likely occur over several years. How would Gaza and Hamas fit into such a framework? First off, as specified in the Oslo Accords, Gaza and the West Bank would be treated as a “single territorial unit.” Thus, the de jure sovereignty of the future state of Palestine over Gaza would be recognized in the treaty.

Second, because Israel has no settlers and no military installations in Gaza, performance-based implementation there could, in principle, proceed much more rapidly than in the West Bank. The key step that Israel would be taking would be lifting the air and sea blockade of the Strip, and giving the green light to Egypt to establish a normal international border between Egypt and the state of Palestine.

The performance-based quid pro quo that Israel would demand before taking such steps would be:

* An end to any attacks on Israel from Gaza;

* The transfer of governmental power and weaponry in Gaza from Hamas and other groups to the new government of Palestine;

* The implementation of effective mechanisms to ensure that Gaza complies with non-militarisation clauses of the peace treaty, including monitoring of the flow of weapons.

Are there any circumstances in which Hamas would agree to such provisions, in exchange for the lifting of the air and sea embargo of Gaza, in the context of independence? The key issue is whether Hamas would be given the opportunity to participate in governing the state of Palestine. And it is with respect to this issue that the peace negotiations need to be reconceived.

It should be recalled that in the Mecca accord of February 2007, in which Fatah and Hamas agreed to establish a unity government, Hamas agreed that the PLO has the authority to negotiate for the Palestinian people, provided that any negotiated treaty is ratified, either by a referendum of the Palestinian people, or by a reformed PLO that would include Hamas. Israel should have embraced this framework, because it offered a procedural path to a peace agreement that would have the potential to bind those who opposed its substance on ideological grounds. Instead, the Olmert government continued to spurn negotiations with the PLO.

It was only after the coup in Gaza, when the unity government fell apart, and when Hamas pronounced that Abbas had forfeited his mandate to negotiate for the Palestinian people, that the Olmert government embraced Abbas as a negotiating partner. It did this not because Abbas suddenly had an enhanced ability to bind the Palestinians. Indeed he had less authority. Rather, he and negotiations were embraced as part of an Israeli-American strategy to dislodge Hamas from power.

The Mecca formula, which was earlier expressed in the National Reconciliation Document of the Palestinian prisoners, can be revived, even outside a unity government. The key to that, however, is for Hamas to have a genuine opportunity to compete for power within a democratic Palestinian state. But herein lies a problem. The efforts of the United States, Israel and Fatah to deny Hamas the fruits of its surprise victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections have created a credibility problem. Why should Hamas believe that it would be allowed to govern if it wins elections in the future? And if Hamas does not believe that, then why should it accept the authority of a new Palestinian state? In short, Hamas needs to be convinced that next time will be different from last time.

One way to start is for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to announce their agreement that the treaty under negotiation will take effect only if it is ratified by a Palestinian referendum, and to further specify that Israel will recognize any democratically elected government of the state of Palestine, provided only that such a government recognizes a referendum-ratified treaty as binding international law.

Going this route will give Hamas a stake in the negotiations. Not all in Hamas will respond positively to this, but it will be appealing to many. It offers a political transformation that can be a way out for all parties. Israel should take this risk. Reverse course on Hamas, de-escalate in Gaza, and focus on negotiations with the PLO. There is no better option.

*Jerome M. Segal directs the Jerusalem Project at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies.

TEN PIECES OF ADVICE FOR #44

TEN PIECES OF ADVICE FOR #44

M.J. Rosenberg*

Source: Israel Policy Forum (http://www.israelpolicyforum.org), February 8, 2008, Distributed by the Common Ground News Service, after editing for length, with permission to publish.

Once again, the Israelis are reducing the electricity supply to Gaza. The cutbacks are a response to increased Hamas attacks in Israel, and come despite their disproved effectiveness, and a strong warning from the Bush administration. Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman, said “We understand Israel’s right to defend itself, but we do not think that action should be taken that would infringe upon or worsen the humanitarian situation for the civilian population in Gaza.” Human Rights Watch said that the fuel and expected electricity cuts “amount to collective punishment which is a violation of international law.”

Clearly the next US President will have to deal with the worsening Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No matter who it is, they should draw on the experiences of past Presidents. That task has been made considerably easier by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a US government think tank, which has just published Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East.

The USIP report is based on interviews with policy insiders in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, who were asked what works and what doesn’t in Middle East diplomacy. They came up with ten lessons for the next set of US Middle East negotiators. None of these lessons are new, but the USIP team weaves them into a serious policy document that will prove invaluable to future administrations.

The 10 lessons:

Number 1 is the simple recognition that perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict damages America’s “ability to build alliances for other critical challenges facing the region, such as the situations in Iran and Iraq. It also fuels instability and violent conflict in neighbouring arenas, such as Lebanon.”

Number 2 is that “US policy must never be defined anywhere but in Washington. Consultations with the parties must take place and policy revisions based on those consultations are inevitable, but our policy must be seen as our own.”

Number 3 is that the United States “must not only exploit openings but also actively encourage, seek out, and create opportunities for peacemaking.”

Number 4 is that “the peace process has moved beyond incrementalism and must aim for endgame solutions.” The report states that “building a web of regional support is critical not only for insulating the process from rejectionist forces (e.g., Iran and its allies) but as a building block for pursuing US interests in the Gulf and across the region.” The report faults the Bush administration for twice “failing to respond when Arab states indicated a fundamental change in policy in 2002 and 2007 with the Saudi-backed Arab peace initiative.” The United States must work harder to win the support of Arab governments for our diplomatic efforts.

Number 5 is that “commitments made by the parties and agreements entered into must be respected and implemented. The United States must ensure compliance through monitoring, setting standards of accountability, reporting violations fairly to the parties, and exacting consequences when commitments are broken or agreements not implemented.” This is a reference to the oft-promised settlement freeze and dismantlement of illegal outposts which seem never to happen. It also refers to America’s reliance on Israel to determine whether Palestinians are sticking to their pledges of non-violence rather than using our own monitoring mechanisms (under President Clinton, the CIA did the monitoring and Palestinian suicide bombing ceased).

Number 6 is that “the direct intervention of the President is vital, but Presidential assets are finite and should be used selectively and carefully. Too direct a role runs the risk of devaluing the power of the office. Too modest a role runs the other risk of failing to capitalise on diplomatic opening. The direct involvement of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, all of whom helped lead important negotiations and conclude path-breaking Arab-Israeli agreements, is instructive in its careful calibration of purpose, process, timing, and the selective use of presidential assets.” In other words, utilise direct Presidential involvement only when Presidential intervention is almost guaranteed to produce the desired effect.

Number 7 is to “build a diverse and experienced negotiating team steeped in regional and functional expertise; encourage open debate and collaboration within the government. A dysfunctional policy process should not be tolerated. US policymakers repeatedly stressed to the study group six elements of organizational success: clear lines of authority; a disciplined, diverse, and experienced team; debate; deliberation; information sharing; and proper policy planning and preparation. For much of the period under review, however, many of these elements were lacking.”

Number 8 is to “build broad and bipartisan domestic support and use political capital before it is too late in a presidential term. Keep Congress well informed. Cultivate close relations on Capitol Hill and with advocacy communities without being held captive to the agendas of domestic groups.”

The panel believes that domestic political considerations, and the pro-Israel lobby, “influence policies” but do not determine them. It states that “Presidential leadership is the most decisive factor. When Presidents lead in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Congress and public opinion follow; as legislators from both parties told the study group.”

Number 9 is that “a successful envoy needs the strong and unambiguous support of the White House, credibility with all parties, and a broad mandate. Envoys should not substitute for meaningful diplomacy. Better a policy without an envoy than an envoy without a policy.”

Number 10 is that the United States “use the diplomatic toolbox judiciously and pay close attention to developments on the ground. Tools, such as economic assistance and summitry, should be used with strategic objectives in mind, not merely to buy time.”

The USIP report is extremely valuable but its recommendations are hardly revolutionary. None of them would require America to abandon its friendship with Israel; in fact, all the recommendations are predicated on our strong alliance with Israel. It is that friendship˜and the trust the two sides have in the other˜that makes successful diplomacy possible. That is why it is the United States, and not the EU or the UN, that can broker an agreement. Only America can. A President who sets his mind to it can end this conflict and thereby vastly enhance not only America’s security but Israel’s as well. The 44th President of the United States may not hold all the cards, but he or she will hold most of them. Advice to #44: Play them.

*MJ Rosenberg is the Director of Israel Policy Forum’s Washington Policy Center. distributed by the Common Ground News Service This article has been edited for length concerns.

DESTRUCTIVE EMOTION

DESTRUCTIVE EMOTION

Arab News Editorial

This article, edited from its original version, is distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to publish. Source: Arab News (http://www.arabnews.com), March 7. 2008.

If Arabs are accused of being too emotional over the Palestinian situation, Israelis are perceived as calculating and manipulative. It is a notion to which many Arabs subscribe, seeing it as a major reason for Israel’s continued dominance over the Palestinians.

But this theory of over-emotionalism is not so simple. It is not a straightforward case of weak, divided, emotional Arabs outmanoeuvred by calculating, manipulative Israelis, as some would suggest. In fact, events in Gaza tell a different story. The Israelis are capable of being as emotional and illogical as anyone else – perhaps far more so. Their response to the rocket attacks from Gaza has been one of cruel, blind rage – a mad outburst of bombs, tanks and missiles, killing well over a hundred men, women and children in response to just one Israeli killed. Hysterical threats of a “holocaust” in the Strip attest to a political mindset that is out of control, illogical and in conflict with Israel’s own long-term interests.

This highlights another reversal of accepted opinions. Far from being the masters of skilful manipulation, the Israeli have, in fact, allowed themselves to be manipulated by a calculating Hamas. The latter does not want the two-state solution that Washington hopes to broker and the Israelis and the government of President Mahmoud Abbas are apparently willing to accept – and has found the perfect way to prevent it. It fires homemade rockets into Israel; the enraged Israelis respond in turn with like-minded brutality; and President Abbas is forced to stop negotiating ˜ at least while Israel destroys Gaza.

Ostensibly, things have now moved on. The Palestinian and Israeli governments have decided to talk again following the Israeli pullout from Gaza. With that the peace process is apparently back on track. But for how long? The Israelis say that there will be no further attacks on Gaza if Hamas stops its rocket attacks. That is dangerous language. It is an invitation to Hamas to fire even more rockets. Hamas needs Israel to be as brutal as possible. It feeds off it for its own struggle with Fatah for the hearts and minds of Palestinians. It boosts it martyr-appeal while making Fatah seem treacherous for negotiating with the enemy. Moreover, the last thing Hamas wants is a Fatah government that can deliver a peace deal. That could spell death for Hamas.

President Abbas has taken a risk for peace; he has agreed that restarting talks should not be dependent on a Gaza truce. That demonstrates his commitment to peace. If the Israelis desire the peace they claim, they too have to show commitment. They have to stop responding with emotional hysteria to Hamas’ calculated taunts. Israelis must be prepared to take the same risks for peace that they demand of Palestinians; they should lay emotion aside and get on with the negotiations regardless of what is happening on the ground, or in the air.

THE MORAL MAJORITY FOR PEACE

THE MORAL MAJORITY FOR PEACE

Gershon Baskin*

Source: Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com), March 10, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

Reaching a peace agreement by the end of the year seems almost impossible. The violence and the rage on the streets of both Israel and Palestine is once again in full gear. Israel killed more than 100 Palestinians in the last “operation” in Gaza – more than half of them civilians. Palestinian celebrations in Gaza after the murderous attack in Mercaz Harav and crowds of Israelis calling “death to the Arabs” once again demonstrates that we learned little. Jews and Arabs have been killing each other over this land for 100 years. The mutual calls for revenge continue to feed this horrific cycle of death and destruction. Many of our political leaders, on both sides, follow the mob response calling for more death, more blood, and more revenge. How many more families must bury their dear ones before we all wake up and realize that this must end? Fortunately Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas responded to the recent violence positively stating: “Despite all the circumstances we’re living through and all the attacks we’re experiencing, we insist on peace. There is no other path.”

Israeli leaders have been less explicit. This is most unfortunate. Leaders on both sides should sound a voice of morality recognizing that the mutual violence will continue as long as there is no political agreement to the end of the conflict.

I find it beyond comprehension that people on both sides actually believe that the way to end the violence of the other side is to hit them with more force and more suffering. How can any rational person believe that if we kill more of “them” that they will simply surrender? Would we? If the Palestinians continue to kill us in a wholesale manner would we consider surrendering our rights? Would we lay down our arms and make concessions on our rights for liberty, freedom, statehood, and justice because we suffer losses?

Palestinians are no different than us on matters concerning their national dignity, dreams of statehood and demands for justice. If we were occupied and denied our freedom would we lay down our arms? Would we adopt strategies of non-violence? I doubt it. No, it is not easy to reach a negotiated end to this 100-year conflict. Both political systems are so weak, divided and dysfunctional that it is almost impossible for the political leaders to find the courage necessary to give each other the minimum concessions needed to produce an agreement.

In our divided political systems, the “spoilers” of peace on both sides seem to have more power to destroy than the leaders have to negotiate. The public outcry for revenge is the food that energizes the spoilers. The leaders have almost no support. They must stand against the tide of cynicism and the real sense of despair that peace is not possible.

Reaching a peace agreement, however, is possible. An agreement cannot be reached in any kind of public forum. An agreement cannot be reached by negotiating each of the issues separately. The issue of Jerusalem cannot be detached from the issue of borders, refugees, security or even economic relations. Each one of the issues is inter-connected and inter-dependent. The agreement will be a package deal with trade-offs on the various issues. The agreement will provide each side with at least the minimum of what is defined as their key national security and strategic interests. Both sides will need to feel that they got the most that was possible. Both sides will have to feel that they have achieved some sense of justice for their people. Both sides will have to sell the agreement to their public in some form of democratic process.

If I were in the Israeli leadership I would be conducting secret negotiations since July 2007. I would engage only my closest confidantes in those talks. I would know that if even an inkling of the concessions being considered were made known, the coalition would collapse, elections would take place and under the current political mood, opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu and the right-wing would take over and lead us to more doom, death and destruction.

I would understand that I need until the end of the year gifted to us by President George W. Bush and his Annapolis summit. I would use each and every one of those remaining days to produce the best agreement possible.

I would even agree to a one-year cease-fire with Hamas that would provide the quiet required to negotiate. The cease-fire would put an end to the rocket fire in the south. Yes, it would tie our hands in our ability to respond militarily to potential dangers and risks in Gaza and in the West Bank. It would require that we significantly increase our security and even intelligence cooperation with the security forces of Abbas (which is in our interest to do anyway).

It would require us to understand that Hamas will continue to smuggle weapons into Gaza and that we would have to increase our cooperation with Egypt in order to destroy these tunnels. It means that we would have to end our strangulation of Gaza for the coming year. The cease-fire cannot be kept in place if the people of Gaza continue to feel under siege and their private sector brought to total bankruptcy.

I would understand that once I have an agreement in hand, I would call for new elections in Israel. I would be convinced that the overwhelming majority of Israelis would support the agreement. I would know that because the silent majority of Israelis desire life and peace. I would hope that Abbas would also lead a democratic process in Palestine that even if limited to the West Bank would produce a moral majority that would be significant enough to demonstrate that the Palestinian people support peace also. I would understand that the implementation of the agreement would take place over a number of years and that a change in the political situation in Gaza would enable it to be implemented there as well.

I would understand that we need to work together to create conditions on the ground that would enable significant improvements in the daily lives of Palestinians. If security conditions did not allow for the removing of many check points immediately, I would work with the Palestinians to transfer the civil and administration control over any area that would no longer be part of Israel, including most of what is know as area “c”. There would be no need for Israel to continue to control planning and building in most of the West Bank. I would understand that I hold the keys that open many doors of hope for both the Palestinians and Israelis.

No, I could not do it alone, but fortunately I would have a partner in President Abbas who continues to show his commitment and courage to lead his people to peace; and I would stand tall knowing that I too had the courage and the moral commitment to lead the people of Israel.

*Gershon Baskin is the co-CEO of the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (www.ipcri.org).

WHY LOSE EGYPT?

WHY LOSE EGYPT?

Nazir Majali*

Source: Ha’aretz (http://www.haaretz.com), February26. 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with  permission for republication.

For several months now, the media has been reporting that Israel is angry at Egypt’s behaviour. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who is responsible for strengthening Israel’s ties with the rest of the world, launched this trend in December. The rightist opposition continued it, from MK Yuval Steinitz to former minister Avigdor Lieberman.

After Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced that red lines had been crossed and Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit threatened that Egypt could have a negative influence on Israel’s interests, Israeli officials ceased speaking on the record, but continued to attack Egypt anonymously, via unnamed “government officials.”

The obvious question is, What would Israel gain by destroying its relationship with Egypt, of all countries, and now, of all times, when Egypt is mediating the release of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit? Has Israel stopped seeing the largest Arab state as a partner˜one that could affect change in the Middle East and lead it toward comprehensive peace and an historic reconciliation? Does Israel intend from now on to rely on the emirate of Qatar rather than Egypt?

The grievance against Egypt, as formulated by Livni, is that its efforts to stop arms smuggling across its border with Gaza are “terrible, problematic and impair the ability to advance the peace process.” Others have reiterated the old cliché about a “cold peace.”

Some Jewish „experts‰ rely on numerous studies to „prove” that Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel not out of an ideological commitment to peace, but solely out of self-interest. Therefore, the argument goes, Egypt should be considered suspect, and woe to the prime minister who does not toe the line of this paradigm. The truth so far from these conclusions is that they raise questions, and even suspicions, as to whether someone has an interest in burning the bridge that Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin built between their countries.

Egypt indeed conducts its policies in accordance with its own interests as an independent state, and Israel cannot dictate its behaviour. The Israeli government may well be opposed to these policies, and it is free to criticise them. But to give them a grade of “terrible” and accuse Egypt of hindering the peace process, even when it knows full well that this will elicit a less than positive response˜that is astounding.

Moreover, these criticisms are wrong. The Egyptians, even with their inadequate forces, have seized tons of weapons and explosives before they were even transferred into Sinai. They have discovered and blown up tunnels between Egyptian Rafah and Palestinian Rafah, and arrested dozens of people in Sinai who were suspected of hostile activity against Israel.

Egypt itself has been a victim of many terrorist attacks that have exacted a heavy toll. It therefore has a supreme interest in fighting terror. The fact that it is a large Arab country, inhabited by millions of people who see Israel as an occupier that oppresses the Palestinian people (which is also how many Israelis and Western leaders see it), compels Egypt to act cautiously and wisely in order not to undermine the main battle, against terrorism.

Even if this is inconvenient for Israel, it is wrong to hurl accusations at Egypt. It is always vital to remember the essential point, which is that since the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed in 1979, Israel’s situation has changed for the better. Peace brought an end to the total war Israel had previously waged against the entire Arab world. Since the treaty was signed, and to a large extent because of it, some 80 additional countries worldwide have recognised Israel. It has signed a peace treaty with Jordan, and the way has been paved for peace with the Palestinians.

This “cold peace” has survived many difficult events, such as Sadat’s assassination, the first and second Lebanon wars, and the first and second Intifadas. Does it really pay for Israel to sacrifice this peace on the altar for a war of words?

* Nazir Majali is an Israeli affairs analyst for Arab television stations and the newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat.

FOR PALESTINIANS, THE POWER OF NONVIOLENCE WOULD BE UNDENIABLE

FOR PALESTINIANS, THE POWER OF NONVIOLENCE WOULD BE UNDENIABLE

Jonathan Freedland*

This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at <http://www.commongroundnews.org.

Now that Fidel Castro has taken the carriage clock, international affairs has all too few fixed points of continuity. Her Majesty the Queen is still in place. The King of Thailand has been on the throne since 1946. Otherwise one has to turn to the Middle East for reassurance that some things never change. Fly-by-nights like Castro may come and go, but the Israel-Palestine conflict will, it seems, always be with us.

A              fter the one-day peace meeting in Annapolis last November, some believed that was about to change. Surely George Bush, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas wouldn’t stand in front of a quarter of the world’s foreign ministers and promise to reach a peace accord by the end of 2008 only for nothing to happen.

And yet here we are, nearly a hundred days later, and Israelis and Palestinians are still having talks about talks. Negotiators have not yet even broached the substance, but are instead stuck trying to agree on guiding “principles.” There’s a big argument over whether they should be discussing Jerusalem now or later. The pessimists who thought the two sides would at least start negotiating ˆ only for their talks to founder later ˆ now realise they were too hopeful.

The victims of this stasis are of course the people themselves: the Israelis of Sderot cowering in shelters from the Qassam rockets launched from Gaza; and the Palestinians, whose suffering only seems to deepen.

Last week Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian parliamentarian, independent of both Hamas and Abbas’s Fatah, was in London, a laptop in his bag bearing an impossibly bleak PowerPoint presentation. In slide after slide, he showed what his people are up against.

To explode the myth of Annapolis, he showed how Palestinian freedom of movement is more restricted now than it was on the day of all those fine speeches. Now there are 561 checkpoints on the West Bank; in November there were 520. His figures showed an increase in Israeli attacks of 220% (largely, no doubt, in retaliation for those incoming Qassams). He counted 177 Palestinian deaths since Annapolis, the vast bulk in Gaza.

Yes, it was true that the confidence-building measure of prisoner releases happened: 788 Palestinians have been set free. But how much confidence could that build when 1,152 have been newly arrested since Annapolis?

On Barghouti went, showing photographs of the separation barrier that, by his estimate, is three times longer than the Berlin wall and, in parts, twice as high: eight metres of concrete. He cited the notorious case of Qalqilya, thoroughly encircled by the wall, with only an Israeli-policed gate allowing access to the outside world. He illustrates his point with a photograph of Palestinian children going to school through that gate, supervised by an Israeli soldier.

I know there will be people ready to dispute every one of those figures, along with the statistics that show Palestinians living on an annual income of $800 while Israelis earn an average $24,500. There will be others who insist that the wall, however dismal, has done its job, in that the number of suicide bombings has fallen drastically since it went up. (Barghouti rejects that, noting that he and other Palestinians can still get around the wall and the checkpoints when they try.) But the reality he describes ˆ of poverty, of restriction, of occupation ˆ can hardly be denied.

The question is what to do about it. The diplomatic path currently looks futile. Veteran peace negotiator Hussein Agha sees no hope until Hamas and Fatah can somehow be bound together so that Abbas can negotiate on behalf of the entire Palestinian people. Otherwise, the Palestinians have to rely on that much more fickle commodity – world opinion – hoping it can keep up the pressure for their cause. In this context, no opinion matters more than America’s: the one country that can lean on Israel and make a difference.

But how to craft a Palestinian narrative that will capture and keep that attention? Barghouti likes to compare the Palestinians’ plight to that of the black victims of apartheid, hoping to arouse a similar global movement to the one that demanded change in South Africa. That’s surely doomed. Witness the response in much of the US commentary to Jimmy Carter’s recent book Palestine Peace Not Apartheid. The argument soon shifted not to the occupation but to the treatment of Arab citizens inside Israel itself: these Palestinians have the vote, nearly a dozen members of parliament, a supreme court justice and so on˜all without equivalent in apartheid South Africa. If campaigners want the focus to remain on the occupation, rather than to be thrown on to the defensive, they need to take a different tack.

In our conversation Barghouti was lukewarm on boycotts (apart from a boycott of Israel’s arms industry). Perhaps he recognises that this too is a tactic which alienates potential allies – by proposing ostracism in place of engagement and stirring unhappy memories, at least among Jews, of boycotts past.

So what’s left? Barghouti is a long-time advocate of non-violent resistance. He and others were struck by the worldwide impact Gazans made last month when they punched a hole through the border wall separating them from Egypt. Unarmed men and women ran through and started shopping˜grabbing whatever supplies they could. That prompted a discussion that reached deep into Hamas itself: what if Palestinians made a similarly non-violent assault on the border separating Gaza from Israel?

So far the idea has come to nothing. Some fear that the risk would be too great, that there’s no guarantee that even civilian protesters bursting through a military border would not end up facing gunfire. Others ask what would happen once they got across: where would they go, what would they do? To sustain such a demonstration would require a degree of organisation which no movement outside Hamas could muster˜and Hamas, currently besieged, is under too much pressure to pull that off. Besides, Abbas would see any such move as a challenge to his own authority and would oppose it.

Nevertheless, non-violent encounters with Israeli authority ˆ whether at checkpoints or even at the gates of Jewish settlements ˆ might be the best hope Palestinians have of winning the sympathy of outsiders. Palestinians could compare their struggle to the Martin Luther King movement for civil rights, walking and marching for their freedom.

Of course there are problems with this approach, starting with the fact that Palestinians and Israelis live in separate places and lead separate lives˜far more distant even than the black and white of 1960s segregated America. They cannot threaten to withdraw their labour because few Palestinians work in the Israeli economy. They have little leverage.

And yet, the power of mass non-violence would be undeniable. My own hunch is that even Israelis themselves, given enough of a respite from rocket assaults and suicide bombings, and forced to confront the realities of Palestinian life, would waver in the face of such a movement.

Perhaps there is another story Palestinians could tell, one that would win the attention of those parts of the world they need to persuade. But they need to find one soon˜if their suffering is not to become one of the last, unchanging facts in a fast-changing world.

*Jonathan Freedland is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster. He writes a weekly column in The Guardian, as well as a monthly piece for The Jewish Chronicle.